A consultant takes charge of arms buying
On 1 August 2014, Germany’s Defence Ministry gained a new state secretary responsible for armaments: Katrin Suder. Until then, according to parliament’s press service, she had run McKinsey’s office in Berlin. Five years later, a parliamentary committee of inquiry would hear 41 witnesses and examine 4,720 files about the ministry’s use of outside consultants, and the minister’s first official mobile phone would turn out to have been wiped. This case follows the money, the audit findings and the personal ties that the inquiry examined, and sets out whom its final report held responsible, and whom it did not.
The client
The client was the German state. The Defence Ministry runs the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed forces, and its procurement agency buys the equipment they use. Every euro it spends is taxpayers’ money. In 2014, KPMG reviewed nine major arms projects with a combined value of more than €50 billion; the review was commissioned on 27 June and delivered on 6 October, according to the inquiry report. Suder later told the inquiry that the big projects had been almost without exception in significant difficulty on time and cost. The minister, Ursula von der Leyen, launched a reform programme called Agenda Rüstung, and Suder was put in charge of armaments management.
Source context: [1]
The alumni
Suder made no secret of her background. “My background was known. I came from the consulting industry,” she told the inquiry in January 2020, as reported by vergabeblog.de. She brought in help. Gundbert Scherf, another McKinsey alumnus, became her adviser on armaments; in early 2017 he returned to McKinsey. Another former colleague from McKinsey’s Berlin office, Oliver Triebel, was managing director of a small firm called LEAD. In 2015, according to the inquiry report, LEAD received a €14,000 contract for an event without a tender, and the justification included Triebel’s acquaintance with Suder. Three larger contracts followed: €143,500 in 2016, €123,200 in 2017 and €102,900 in 2018. The Federal Audit Office called the awards contrary to procurement law, and the ministry’s own internal check agreed.
Follow the money
According to the Federal Audit Office, as cited in the inquiry report, the ministry signed 182 consulting contracts worth about €100 million in 2015, and 193 worth about €150 million in 2016. The ministry disputed those figures and counted fewer: 139 contracts worth €83 million in 2015, and 138 worth €134 million in 2016. Yet in 2016 only €2.9 million was reported to the Finance Ministry as consulting. The auditors said that some of what had been booked as support services should have counted as consulting. By the first half of 2019, Euronews reported, the Defence Ministry and its agencies had spent €155 million in six months on outside consultants and support services, roughly as much as the other 13 federal ministries combined. About €109 million of it went through BWI, the Bundeswehr’s own IT company.
The audit
In January 2018, an anonymous submission reached the Federal Audit Office, and its auditors examined how the ministry hired outside help. An auditor told the Defence Committee in March 2019 that in 55% of the cases reviewed there was no justification for using outsiders, in 75% the economic need had not been described, and in 30% the procurement itself was flawed. She called it a far too high error rate.
One route stood out. Framework agreement 20237 had been set up for IBM software products, maintenance and related services. The ministry had used it to buy other work, and in every case examined, according to the inquiry report, the auditors found that use inadmissible.
The christening
The case that drew most attention was a software project known as PLM. In December 2017, the procurement agency ordered €6.5 million of work through framework agreement 20237. The framework holder passed the work to a single subcontractor, Accenture, and added €100 for every consultant day without doing any work of its own, an Audit Office auditor told the inquiry. Accenture, the report found, had been chosen early and without competition.
Then came the personal ties. General Erhard Bühler, head of the ministry’s planning department, was godfather to the children of Timo Noetzel, Accenture’s client account lead for the Bundeswehr. Suder had been a witness at a christening, and Scherf was also a godfather, according to parliament’s press service. Bühler called any link between those ties and the contract defamation. Noetzel told the inquiry that Accenture’s prices were clearly market rate, and that he had reported his friendship with Suder to Accenture’s compliance team.
Keep the alumni network out of the award
- 01Compete when you know the buyer
When a former colleague is the client, insist on open competition and documented scoring.
- 02Recuse completely
Record the scope and date of every recusal, and route all related decisions to someone else.
- 03Label advice honestly
Book consulting as consulting, so that the total spend is visible to budget holders and parliament.
The subsidiary
McKinsey’s name came up too. BWI awarded two contracts directly to Orphoz, which the inquiry report describes as a subsidiary of McKinsey: one worth €2.4 million and one worth €3.15 million. An investigation by Deloitte found that both were unlawful direct awards, placed responsibility with BWI’s managing director and found no financial loss. Orphoz said its staff believed the awards met the procurement rules.
Suder had stepped back from the BWI matter on 15 December 2017, because the anonymous submissions also named her. The inquiry found that she did not step back fully. It never established whether she knew about the Orphoz awards.
Source context: [1]
The inquiry
On 30 January 2019, the Bundestag’s Defence Committee constituted itself as a committee of inquiry. It sat 17 times and heard 41 witnesses. Then the minister’s phone became a story. According to the inquiry report, von der Leyen’s first official phone was handed in during the summer of 2019, securely wiped by the ministry’s IT service and returned to the supplier in August. A Green member of parliament, Tobias Lindner, filed a criminal complaint over the lost data; the sources reviewed report no outcome.
On 13 February 2020, von der Leyen, by then President of the European Commission, testified for about five hours. Mistakes had also been made in a considerable effort to rebuild, she told the committee, according to parliament’s press service. She denied irregularities, the Irish Times reported.
The reckoning
On 16 September 2020, the committee delivered a report of about 720 pages. The governing coalition’s majority placed overall responsibility for the Accenture case on General Bühler, who had since retired. It saw no direct responsibility for Suder for the unlawful call-offs, but found that she had helped give Accenture’s manager special access to the ministry and had backed the decision to use Accenture.
The majority made no accusation against von der Leyen. The opposition parties said in their dissenting views that key findings had been left out or played down. Whether the federal budget had suffered damage, the report said, could not be established with sufficient certainty. The sources reviewed show no fine, repayment or official finding against McKinsey & Company itself, Orphoz or Accenture. The ministry had already tightened its rules, with a central office for buying outside advice from October 2018 and a new regulation from 1 November 2018.
THE SEQUENCE
A timeline of the case
Suder joins the ministry
The head of McKinsey’s Berlin office becomes state secretary for armaments. [4]
KPMG arms review
Nine major projects worth more than €50bn are reviewed; Agenda Rüstung follows. [1]
LEAD contract
A €14,000 award without tender to a firm run by an ex-McKinsey colleague; three larger contracts follow. [1]
€150m by the auditors’ count
The Audit Office counts 193 contracts, while only €2.9m is reported as consulting. [1]
PLM call-off
€6.5m is ordered through an IBM-software framework and passed to Accenture. [1]
Anonymous submission
A tip reaches the Federal Audit Office, which examines how the ministry hires outside help. [5]
Inquiry constituted
The Defence Committee becomes a committee of inquiry. [5]
Phone wiped
The minister’s first official phone, wiped by the IT service, goes back to the supplier. [1]
Von der Leyen testifies
About five hours of evidence; she says mistakes were also made. [7]
Final report
Overall responsibility for the Accenture case is placed on General Bühler. [2]
Hiring expertise brings its network
Governments recruit from consulting firms for good reasons. A ministry facing nine major arms projects worth more than €50 billion, almost all of them in difficulty on time and cost by Suder’s later account, needs people who know how to run complex programmes. Katrin Suder’s appointment as state secretary in 2014 was a deliberate choice to bring that experience in. She told the inquiry that her background was known and that she came from the consulting industry.
The difficulty is that expertise arrives with a network. Former colleagues become advisers, suppliers or bidders. In this case, a former McKinsey colleague became Suder’s armaments adviser, and another ran a small firm that received a €14,000 contract without a tender, with a justification that included his acquaintance with her. Three larger contracts followed. The Federal Audit Office called the awards contrary to procurement law, and the ministry’s own check agreed. None of this required anyone to act in bad faith. It required only that the normal safeguards of competition and documentation were not applied to people the decision-makers already knew. The France McKinsey affair shows a similar debate about how closely consultants and senior officials should work together.
The error rate behind the headlines
The personal ties drew the headlines, but the Federal Audit Office’s numbers are more instructive. In the cases its auditors reviewed, there was no justification for using outsiders in 55%, the economic need was not described in 75%, and the procurement itself was flawed in 30%. An auditor told parliament it was a far too high error rate.
These are failures of basic process, not of exotic conflicts. A requirement to justify the use of outsiders and to describe the economic need is meant to force an organisation to ask whether it should build capacity internally instead. When that step is skipped in most cases, external spending grows without anyone deciding that it should. By the first half of 2019, Euronews reported, the Defence Ministry and its agencies were spending €155 million in six months on outside consultants and support, roughly as much as the other 13 federal ministries combined. A business case calculator is a simple way to force the justification step: what is the need, what does the outside help cost, and what is the alternative?
Labels hide totals
One detail deserves more attention than it received. In 2016, according to the Audit Office as cited in the inquiry report, only €2.9 million was reported to the Finance Ministry as consulting, while the auditors counted contracts worth about €150 million. The ministry disputed the auditors’ count, but the auditors’ point was that some work booked as support services should have counted as consulting.
Classification is not a technicality. Parliaments and finance ministries control consulting spending by looking at the consulting line. If advice is booked under another heading, the control fails silently. The same problem appears in private companies when strategy work is coded as IT, programme management or training. Finance teams should define consulting by what the work is, not by what the supplier or budget holder prefers to call it.
Frameworks used for the wrong purpose
The Accenture case turned on a framework agreement set up for IBM software products, maintenance and related services. The ministry used it to buy other work, and the auditors found that use inadmissible in every case examined. In the PLM project, the framework holder passed €6.5 million of work to a single subcontractor, Accenture, and added €100 for every consultant day without doing any work of its own, according to an Audit Office auditor. The inquiry found that Accenture had been chosen early and without competition.
Using an existing framework is tempting because it is fast. But a framework is a competition held for a defined purpose. Using it for something else bypasses the competition and adds a middleman’s margin. The strategic sourcing and procurement presentation guide covers how to present a sourcing route to decision-makers so that its scope and limits are visible before an order is placed.
Recusal is a process, not a statement
Suder stepped back from the BWI matter in December 2017 because anonymous submissions named her. The inquiry found that she did not step back fully, and it never established whether she knew about BWI’s direct awards to Orphoz. For the PLM case, the majority saw no direct responsibility for her for the unlawful call-offs, but found that she had helped give Accenture’s manager special access to the ministry and had backed the choice of Accenture.
The lesson is that recusal must be designed. It should state in writing which matters are covered, from what date, and who takes the decisions instead. Colleagues need to know, so that they do not route related questions back to the person who stepped aside. A RACI matrix generator is a practical way to record who is responsible, accountable, consulted and informed once a recusal takes effect.
Keep the findings in proportion
The inquiry’s outcomes were limited and specific. The majority placed overall responsibility for the Accenture case on General Erhard Bühler, who called any link between his personal ties and the contract defamation. It made no accusation against Ursula von der Leyen; the opposition said key findings were left out or played down. It said it could not establish with sufficient certainty whether the federal budget had suffered damage. Deloitte found BWI’s awards to Orphoz unlawful, placed responsibility with BWI’s managing director and found no financial loss, and Orphoz said its staff believed the awards met the rules. The sources reviewed show no official finding, fine or repayment against McKinsey itself.
These distinctions are easy to lose in a story about networks and christenings. A presentation of the case should keep majority findings, dissent and allegation separate, and should not imply that personal ties alone prove an improper award. The audit committee presentation guide offers a structure for reporting findings of different strength without overstating them.
What the ministry changed
The ministry tightened its rules even before the report: a central office for buying outside advice from October 2018 and a new regulation from 1 November 2018. Central control of consulting purchases is a common response, and it can work if it brings together the three things missing here: a written justification, an honest classification and an open competition. For consultants, the takeaway is direct. When a former colleague is the buyer, insist on competition and documentation, because that is the only protection that will hold up in front of a parliament. The management consulting presentation guide is a reminder that the best-structured advice still depends on the credibility of how it was bought.
TAKE IT INTO THE NEXT MEETING
Three practical lessons
Alumni networks need competition
Former colleagues are an asset until they become the procurement process. When the buyer knows you, open competition is your best protection.
A recusal must be complete
Stepping back from a matter only works if it is total, written down and respected by everyone around the person who recused.
Call consulting what it is
When advice is booked as support services, nobody can see the total. Clear labels protect the client and the adviser.
Questions about the case
Was McKinsey found guilty in Germany’s consultants affair?
No. The sources reviewed show no fine, repayment or official finding against McKinsey & Company. Deloitte found that BWI’s two direct awards to McKinsey’s subsidiary Orphoz were unlawful, placed responsibility with BWI’s managing director and found no financial loss.
Whom did the inquiry hold responsible?
The governing coalition’s majority placed overall responsibility for the Accenture (PLM) case on General Erhard Bühler. It saw no direct responsibility for Katrin Suder for the unlawful call-offs, but found she helped give Accenture’s manager special access. It made no accusation against Ursula von der Leyen; the opposition said findings were played down.
Why was von der Leyen’s phone in the news?
According to the inquiry report, her first official phone was handed in during the summer of 2019 and securely wiped by the ministry’s IT service. A Green MP filed a criminal complaint over the lost data; the sources reviewed report no outcome.
THE EVIDENCE TRAIL
Sources & editorial notes
Adapted from the original XLSlides documentary, with additional analysis. Published 19 November 2026. Sources have different roles: primary records, investigative reporting and the positions of affected parties.
- Deutscher Bundestag: report of the 1st committee of inquiry of the Defence Committee, Drucksache 19/22400, 16 September 2020 ↗Primary report: the KPMG review, LEAD, the audit figures, framework 20237, PLM, Orphoz, the phone, the majority findings and the dissent.
- Deutscher Bundestag: committee of inquiry hands over its final report (text archive, week 38, 2020) ↗Witness, session and file counts, and the report’s handover.
- Deutscher Bundestag, hib: findings of the consultants inquiry, September 2020 ↗Parliament’s press-service summary of the majority findings and the opposition’s view.
- Deutscher Bundestag, hib: Suder, Scherf, LEAD and the christening, November 2019 ↗Testimony on Suder’s background, Scherf’s role, LEAD and the godparent ties.
- Deutscher Bundestag: Federal Audit Office before the Defence Committee (text archive, week 12, 2019) ↗The auditors’ 55%, 75% and 30% findings and the inquiry’s constitution.
- Deutscher Bundestag, hib: Bühler and Noetzel testify, June 2019 ↗Bühler’s “defamation” response and Noetzel’s statements on prices and compliance.
- Deutscher Bundestag, hib: von der Leyen testifies, February 2020 ↗The former minister’s testimony and her statement that mistakes were made.
- vergabeblog.de: Suder said to have kept strictly out of choosing external firms, 31 January 2020 ↗Procurement-law blog report of Suder’s testimony.
- Euronews: €155 million for consultants, Bundeswehr discloses figures, 8 August 2019 ↗First-half 2019 spending and the comparison with other ministries. The site blocks automated checks; read in a browser.
- The Irish Times: European Commission president denies defence irregularities, 13 February 2020 ↗Von der Leyen’s testimony and denial.
- Associated Press, via KSL: von der Leyen testifies on consultant contracts, February 2020 ↗Wire report of the testimony and the background to the affair.
- t-online: Green MP files complaint over deleted data on von der Leyen’s phone ↗Tobias Lindner’s criminal complaint over the wiped phone.
Image credits & licences
Original illustrations and typography: XLSlides. Documentary stills have been resized and converted to WebP for this article. Underlying images retain the credits supplied with the episode.
- McKinsey & Company logo: public domain (text logo), via Wikimedia Commons.
- XLSlides logo: XLSlides.
- The Defence Ministry, BAAINBw, KPMG, the Federal Audit Office, LEAD, Accenture, BWI, Orphoz and Deloitte are shown as typeset name cards; all people are shown as silhouettes; buildings, documents and charts are drawn. Scenes marked "illustrative" are not to scale.
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