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FILE 27 · Contract oversight & statements of work

BCG, New York’s DMV and the Standby Contract

New York sent Boston Consulting Group into its motor vehicles department during the pandemic. The paperwork arrived after the work, and the DMV was rarely in the room.

By XLSlides Editorial12 min read
Original episode artwork from The Consulting Files.Image: XLSlides; underlying image credits below.
THE SHORT ANSWER

In 2020 and 2021, New York’s Division of the Budget used a five-year standby contract to send Boston Consulting Group into the Department of Motor Vehicles. BCG billed about $15m for three projects in 13 months; the statements of work were signed late, the first after its work had ended, and a $24m sequel was drafted without the DMV’s knowledge. In June 2025 the state Inspector General found a project management design failure and insufficient oversight, but no misuse of federal relief funds, and no one was charged. The report credits the first project with reopening the DMV and cutting its backlog.

~$15mBilled for three DMV projects13 months; Inspector General
$32m → $177mGrowth of the standby contract’s cap2019 to the time of the report
9 daysBetween the end of the work and the first signatureStatement of work executed 8 January 2021
WATCH THE DOCUMENTARYOpen on YouTube ↗

Episode premiere: 22 November 2026 at 7:30 am IST. Read the full case study before the premiere.

A contract signed after the work

On 8 January 2021, New York State’s Division of the Budget executed a statement of work for four months of Boston Consulting Group work at the Department of Motor Vehicles: 29 BCG professionals and $6,954,880. The work it covered had ended on 30 December 2020, nine days earlier. By the time the DMV stopped BCG’s work at the end of 2021, the bill for three projects was about $15 million, and a sequel worth about $24 million had been drafted without the DMV’s knowledge, according to New York’s Inspector General. This case follows a standby contract through a pandemic, and sets out what the Inspector General’s June 2025 report found about the state’s oversight of it.

Source context: [1]

The business

BCG sells problem-solving by the hour. On this contract, its rates ran from $239 to $552 an hour per consultant. In 2019, the Division of the Budget issued a request for proposals for what it called world class strategic planning advisors. BCG was judged the best value on both cost and technical merit, and Deloitte came second.

It was a standby contract: no specific project, just pre-negotiated rates that the state could call on when needed, for a term running from 15 August 2019 to 14 August 2024. The cap on spending, the not-to-exceed amount, was $32 million over the five years.

Source context: [1]

The pandemic

Then came COVID-19. State agencies were struggling, and the Division of the Budget allowed them to use its contract. In December 2020 the cap rose to $109 million, and by June 2021 to $134 million, with up to $102 million earmarked for pandemic-related work. BCG helped the Health Department roll out Excelsior Pass, a vaccination-status app used by 11.5 million New Yorkers between 2021 and 2023, according to the report. And it went to the DMV.

Source context: [1]

EXHIBIT 01Original documentary chart of the not-to-exceed cap on New York’s standby contract with BCG, per the Inspector General: $32m in 2019, $109m in December 2020 and $134m in June 2021.Image: Original XLSlides animation; sources and image credits below.

The DMV

The DMV registers vehicles and licenses drivers. In 2020 it needed to reopen with a growing backlog. Between May and August, at the direction of then Governor Andrew Cuomo’s Executive Chamber, the budget office asked BCG for a reopening plan; the DMV was not represented at those meetings. A witness testified that Cuomo had said the DMV’s management “left something to be desired”, and a budget official wrote that the DMV had “proven incapable of project managing”. On 18 August, a BCG principal urged a decision within the next few days, and the work began on 24 August.

That autumn, BCG’s role grew. A budget official told her superiors that BCG’s analysis had exposed bloat and waste in the DMV’s existing modernisation project, run since 2016 by another contractor. At a meeting on 12 November 2020, held without the DMV, the plan was set to end that project and build on BCG’s work instead. On 30 November, the DMV notified the other contractor of its intent to terminate.

Source context: [1]

Follow the money

Project one, the reopening, ran for four months with 29 consultants and cost $6.95 million. Project two, a technology assessment and planning for a transformation, cost $4.53 million. Project three, technology design, cost $3.62 million. In the Inspector General’s words, that was “$15 million in billables over its 13 months of work”. The first two projects, about $11.5 million, were paid from federal Coronavirus Relief Funds. The third did not qualify, so the budget office charged it to the DMV’s own budget, “without prior notice to DMV”, the report says.

Source context: [1] [4]

EXHIBIT 02Original documentary illustration of who paid: federal Coronavirus Relief Funds covered projects one and two, about $11.5m, and the budget office charged project three, about $3.6m, to the DMV’s budget “without prior notice”, per the Inspector General.Image: Original XLSlides animation; sources and image credits below.

The paperwork

The paperwork kept arriving late. The first statement of work was executed after its work had ended; the second more than six weeks after its work had ended; the third four days before its work ended. In the meantime, BCG was working at risk of not being paid. The DMV, the agency that would live with the results, first saw a statement of work in November 2021.

The budget office’s engagement manager, the official meant to check deliverables, “did not meaningfully monitor the projects in any way”, the Inspector General found. He testified that no one had explained the role to him: “That was just ignorance.” Asked who was watching the meter, the DMV commissioner, Mark Schroeder, said: “I felt no responsibility to it, and I still don’t.”

Source context: [1]

THE MECHANISM

Sign, include, meter

  1. 01Sign before you start

    Execute a statement of work with scope, price and deliverables before any work begins.

  2. 02Put the real client in the room

    Give the agency that lives with the result a named liaison and a seat in every decision.

  3. 03Watch the meter

    Track spend against each statement of work, and tell an agency before its budget is charged.

Our engagement-control framework, drawn from the Inspector General’s recommendations. It does not imply misconduct by BCG.

The results

Did the work deliver? Partly. The report says the first project was “largely successful at reopening DMV and reducing its backlog”, to the point that same-day appointments became possible. The second project was harder to check: investigators could verify only about two-thirds of its tasks. For the third, they could not fully determine whether the deliverables were adequate. On our reading, the gap lay in the records: without statements of work signed in advance and without active monitoring, there was little to check the deliverables against.

Source context: [1]

The sequel

In October 2021 came a larger plan, called Transformation. Two draft statements of work dated 7 October were priced at $14,717,304 and $9,171,000, about $24 million, with later phases unpriced. According to the report, they were drafted by BCG and one budget official without the DMV’s knowledge, and they were never executed.

At the DMV, there was alarm. One deputy commissioner wrote that a BCG presentation boiled down to “improve everything”, with lots of consultant jargon. Another called the approach “highly unconventional” and wrote that BCG had “seemingly taken special efforts to cloak the process from inquiring DMV employees”. The DMV’s co-chair of the project testified that she had to fight to represent her agency. A DMV memo of 19 November 2021 estimated the cost at about $1 million a week and concluded that BCG “does not offer sufficient value to either DMV or New York State to warrant continuing”.

Source context: [1]

The reckoning

On 30 December 2021, the DMV discontinued BCG’s work; it now runs its transformation itself. In June 2025, the Inspector General, Lucy Lang, published her report. It found “a project management design failure, and insufficient communication and contract oversight”, with decision-making largely in the hands of one person without sufficient checks. “Best intentions cannot be a substitute for best practices,” Lang said. The report found no evidence of any misuse of the federal relief funds, and no one was charged. It recommended an agency liaison, statements of work executed before work begins, and notice to an agency before its budget is charged.

The Division of the Budget said it was reviewing the report and its recommendations, according to Crain’s New York Business. The report quotes no response from BCG, and none was found in the coverage; the work done at risk had led to a dispute with the state over the amount due to BCG. The standby contract kept growing: by the time of the report, more than $140 million had been spent under a cap of $177 million. In 2023, The New York Times reported that BCG was paid $838,000 for support on Governor Kathy Hochul’s State of the State address; her office said the firms involved gave no policy advice, as summarised by Consultor.

Source context: [1] [2] [3] [5]

EXHIBIT 03Original documentary illustration of a DMV memo of 19 November 2021, quoted by the Inspector General, which put the cost of BCG’s proposed work at about $1 million a week.Image: Original XLSlides animation; sources and image credits below.

THE SEQUENCE

A timeline of the case

  1. Standby contract begins

    BCG wins the budget office’s five-year contract, capped at $32m. [1]

  2. DMV reopening work starts

    Planned at the direction of the Governor’s office, without the DMV at the meetings. [1]

  3. Modernisation plan changes

    A meeting without the DMV decides to end another contractor’s project and build on BCG’s work. [1]

  4. Cap raised to $109m

    The pandemic pushes the ceiling up; it reaches $134m by June 2021. [1]

  5. A late signature

    Project one’s $6.95m statement of work is executed nine days after the work ended. [1]

  6. Project three signed

    Executed four days before the work ends; its cost goes to the DMV’s budget. [1]

  7. Transformation drafts

    About $24m in draft statements of work, prepared without the DMV’s knowledge, never signed. [1]

  8. DMV stops BCG

    A DMV memo had put the cost at about $1m a week. [1]

  9. Inspector General’s report

    “Best intentions cannot be a substitute for best practices.” [2]

THE PRACTITIONER’S LENS · OUR ANALYSIS

A useful contract with no edges

A standby contract is a sensible tool. In 2019, New York’s Division of the Budget ran a competition, judged BCG the best value on cost and technical merit, and agreed rates in advance so that the state could call on strategic advice without running a new procurement each time. That is how many governments and companies buy professional services, and it can save time and money.

The weakness of a standby contract is that it has no natural edges. There is no fixed project, so the controls must come from somewhere else: statements of work that define each piece of work, a cap that means something, and someone who watches spending against both. In this case the cap moved from $32 million to $109 million in December 2020 and to $134 million by June 2021, and by the time of the Inspector General’s report more than $140 million had been spent under a cap of $177 million. The pandemic explains much of that growth. It does not replace the controls. The strategic sourcing and procurement presentation guide shows how to present a framework agreement so that its limits are as visible as its convenience.

Sign before you start

The case’s most memorable fact is a date. The first statement of work, for $6,954,880 and 29 BCG professionals, was executed on 8 January 2021, nine days after the work it covered had ended. The second was executed more than six weeks after its work had ended, and the third four days before its work ended. BCG worked at risk throughout, and the report notes that the at-risk work led to a dispute with the state over the amount due.

A statement of work is not a formality to be completed when invoices are due. It is the definition of done: the scope, the deliverables, the price and the people responsible for accepting the work. When it is signed afterwards, it describes what happened rather than governing it. Without an agreed scope to check against, verification is harder: the Inspector General could verify only about two-thirds of the second project’s tasks, and could not fully determine whether the third project’s deliverables were adequate. For consultants, starting work without a signed statement of work also leaves the firm exposed, as the payment dispute here shows. A project status report template that tracks delivery against an agreed scope only works if the scope was agreed first.

Find the real client

The DMV was the agency that would live with the results, yet it was largely absent from the decisions. The reopening plan was developed between May and August 2020 at the direction of the Governor’s Executive Chamber, without the DMV at those meetings. A November 2020 meeting, also without the DMV, set the plan to end its existing modernisation project and build on BCG’s work. The DMV first saw a statement of work in November 2021. The draft Transformation statements of work, about $24 million, were prepared by BCG and one budget official without the DMV’s knowledge.

When a sponsor in one part of government buys work that another part must implement, the implementing agency is the real client. If it is not in the room, it will resist the work, or it will be unable to check it. In this case, both happened: DMV officials described the Transformation plan as boiling down to improve everything, and a DMV memo concluded that BCG did not offer sufficient value to continue. The RACI matrix generator is a simple way to make the implementing agency’s role explicit before work begins.

Someone has to watch the meter

The Inspector General found that the budget office’s engagement manager did not meaningfully monitor the projects in any way; he testified that no one had explained the role to him. The DMV commissioner, asked who was watching the meter, said he felt no responsibility for it. The report also found that decision-making rested largely with one person, without sufficient checks.

Each statement is understandable in isolation. Together, they describe an engagement in which everyone assumed someone else was responsible for cost and quality. Good contract management assigns that responsibility to a named person with the time, knowledge and authority to act. It also requires the buyer to tell an agency before its budget is charged, which did not happen when the third project, ineligible for federal relief funds, was charged to the DMV without prior notice. The audit committee presentation guide covers how to report contract oversight so that gaps like these surface early.

Credit where it is due

The report is not a story of failure from start to finish, and it should not be presented as one. It describes the first project as largely successful at reopening the DMV and reducing its backlog, to the point that same-day appointments became possible. It found no evidence of any misuse of the federal relief funds. No one was charged, and the report’s findings concern the state’s management rather than misconduct by BCG. The report quotes no response from BCG, and none was found in the coverage; the Division of the Budget said it was reviewing the recommendations.

That balance is the most useful part of the case. The reopening appears to have worked. What failed was the structure around it: late paperwork, an absent client, an unwatched meter and a sequel drafted in private. Good work inside a weak structure still ends up in an inspector general’s report. The pandemic contracts case shows the same tension between speed and control across many governments in 2020.

Three rules from Albany

The Inspector General made three recommendations, and they translate directly into practice for any consultant or buyer. Execute statements of work before work begins. Appoint a liaison from the agency that will live with the result. Warn an agency before its budget is charged. Lucy Lang summarised the case in one sentence: best intentions cannot be a substitute for best practices.

For consultants, the commercial lesson is that these rules protect the firm as much as the client. A signed statement of work defines what the firm will be paid for. A client liaison reduces the risk of rejection. A visible meter prevents the kind of surprise that ends engagements abruptly, as the DMV’s decision to stop BCG’s work at the end of 2021 did. The management consulting presentation guide is a reminder that the structure of an engagement is part of the advice. In a crisis, speed matters. So does the paperwork.

TAKE IT INTO THE NEXT MEETING

Three practical lessons

01

Sign before you start

Work without a statement of work is work without a definition of done. Agree scope, price and deliverables first, even in an emergency.

02

Find the real client

The agency that lives with the result must be in the room. A sponsor elsewhere in government is not a substitute.

03

Standby is not a blank cheque

A framework with pre-agreed rates still needs someone to watch the meter, project by project.

Questions about the case

Did BCG do anything illegal at New York’s DMV?

No one was charged, and the Inspector General made no allegation of criminal conduct. The report found failures in the Division of the Budget’s project design, communication and contract oversight, and no evidence of misuse of federal relief funds.

How much did BCG bill for the DMV work?

About $15 million for three projects over 13 months: $6.95 million, $4.53 million and $3.62 million. Two draft statements of work worth about $24 million were never signed, and the work done at risk led to a dispute over the amount due.

What is a standby consulting contract?

A contract with no specific project, only pre-negotiated rates that a government can call on when needed. New York’s 2019 contract with BCG began with a $32 million cap that later rose to $177 million.

THE EVIDENCE TRAIL

Sources & editorial notes

Adapted from the original XLSlides documentary, with additional analysis. Published 19 November 2026. Sources have different roles: primary records, investigative reporting and the positions of affected parties.

  1. New York State Inspector General: the Division of the Budget’s handling of post-COVID-19 reopening and transformation projects at the DMV, June 2025 ↗Primary report: the contract, the cap increases, the three projects, the late statements of work, the drafts, testimony, findings and recommendations. The site blocks automated checks; read in a browser.
  2. New York State Inspector General: report identifies oversight gaps in COVID-era use of a consultant contract, 3 June 2025 ↗Official summary and Lucy Lang’s statement. The site blocks automated checks; read in a browser.
  3. Crain’s New York Business: lax oversight plagued $15m consulting contract for DMV pandemic reopening, 9 June 2025 (Inspector General reprint) ↗Coverage of the report and the Division of the Budget’s response. The site blocks automated checks; read in a browser.
  4. Finger Lakes 1: state report faults oversight in $15m DMV consulting deal, 9 June 2025 ↗Local coverage of the report and its figures.
  5. Consultor: in New York, a speech signed by BCG and Deloitte for $2 million, 20 April 2023 ↗French trade summary of The New York Times’s April 2023 report on the State of the State support; context only.
Image credits & licences

Original illustrations and typography: XLSlides. Documentary stills have been resized and converted to WebP for this article. Underlying images retain the credits supplied with the episode.

  • The New York Times logo: public domain (text logo), via Wikimedia Commons.
  • XLSlides logo: XLSlides.
  • BCG, New York State agencies and the governor's office are shown as typeset name cards; people are shown as silhouettes; the Albany capitol, DMV office, documents, slides and charts are drawn. Scenes marked "illustrative" are not to scale.

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