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FILE 05 · Institutions & procurement

McKinsey, Bain and South Africa’s State Capture

An electricity company, a freight network and a tax authority reveal different ways that institutional safeguards can fail.

By XLSlides Editorial11 min read
Original episode artwork from The Consulting Files.Image: XLSlides; underlying image credits below.
THE SHORT ANSWER

South Africa’s state capture story includes distinct consulting controversies at Eskom, Transnet and SARS. McKinsey Africa’s 2024 US bribery resolution concerns Eskom and Transnet; Bain’s SARS work was examined in separate inquiries. These are not one contract or one legal outcome. The common management question is how procurement, partner selection and institutional challenge can be protected.

3 institutionsDistinct case strandsEskom, Transnet and SARS
$122.85mUS criminal penaltyMcKinsey Africa, December 2024
2018Nugent final reportSARS inquiry
WATCH THE DOCUMENTARYOpen on YouTube ↗

An apology in Johannesburg

On the ninth of July, 2018, the new global head of the world's most famous consulting firm stood before an audience in Johannesburg, and said sorry. "I am very sorry," said Kevin Sneader of McKinsey, "personally and on behalf of McKinsey and Company." That same day, South Africa's state power company confirmed it had received nine hundred and two million rand back from his firm.

And five months later, a retired judge would describe what happened at the country's tax collector as "a premeditated offensive", planned by the local office of a second famous firm: Bain. This is the story of state capture.

Source context: [2]

What is state capture?

Jacob Zuma was South Africa's president from 2009 to 2018. In November 2016, the country's Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, published a report called "State of Capture." It raised concerns that a wealthy business family close to the president, the Guptas, had influence over state-owned companies and even ministerial appointments. The Guptas and Zuma denied wrongdoing. A judicial commission, chaired by Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, spent years hearing evidence. Its reports, published in 2022, found that the tax collector had been deliberately captured, and called key dealings at the power company corruption.

Source context: [3]

The power company

At the center of it all was Eskom. Eskom is owned by the state, and it supplies more than ninety percent of South Africa's electricity. Its business model is simple. It burns coal, generates power, and sells it at prices approved by a regulator. In the year to March 2016, Eskom earned about one hundred and sixty-three billion rand in revenue, but only four point six billion in profit.

Its power stations were old. Since 2008, the country had suffered rolling blackouts, known as load shedding. Eskom needed a turnaround.

Source context: [2] [6]

EXHIBIT 01Eskom’s public role explains why the consequences of a consulting contract extend beyond the fee.Image: Original XLSlides animation; sources and image credits below.

The turnaround deal

McKinsey was hired to help deliver it. The work came with a "supplier development" partner: a local, black-owned firm meant to grow alongside the project. That partner became a firm called Trillian. Investigative reporters linked Trillian to Salim Essa, a business partner of the Guptas. An inquiry by the advocate Geoff Budlender found that McKinsey had agreed to pass thirty percent of its Eskom work to Trillian.

McKinsey later said it never had an official partnership with Trillian, and stopped working with it when Trillian refused to disclose its ownership.

Source context: [6]

Follow the money

The fees were "risk-based": paid according to the results the work was meant to deliver. According to investigative reporting, in 2016 Eskom paid McKinsey and Trillian about one point six billion rand, for roughly six months of work. Around five hundred and sixty-four million rand of that went to Trillian. An interim forensic report found the two firms expected to earn another seven point eight billion.

The problem, reporters found, was that Eskom never got the Treasury's permission for fees like these. Eskom itself later argued that the payments were unlawful.

Source context: [6]

EXHIBIT 02The turnaround deal illustrates the importance of fee structures, partner ownership and the authority approving them.Image: Original XLSlides animation; sources and image credits below.

The railway

Eskom was not the only state company McKinsey worked for. Transnet, the state's freight rail and ports company, earns its money moving coal, ore and containers across the country, and through its harbors. There, between 2012 and 2016, McKinsey worked alongside another local firm, Regiments Capital. Evidence before the Zondo Commission showed that Regiments passed roughly half of the fees it earned to the Guptas and Salim Essa.

McKinsey says it did not know, and in 2018 it said an internal review had found no evidence that the firm engaged in corruption.

Source context: [1] [4]

THE MECHANISM

The institutional risk behind a consulting contract

  1. 01Select partners and scope

    Ownership, authority and procurement rules determine who can influence the work.

  2. 02Tie payments to decisions

    Fees and confidential information can create opportunities for abuse.

  3. 03Preserve public challenge

    Independent procurement, audit and institutional expertise must remain effective.

A cross-case governance interpretation. The McKinsey and Bain matters have separate facts, responses and legal histories.

The tax collector

Now, the second firm. SARS, the South African Revenue Service, collects the country's taxes. In the year to March 2017, it collected more than one trillion rand. According to the Zondo Commission, Bain's South African head, Vittorio Massone, met President Zuma seventeen times between 2012 and 2014. In September 2014, Zuma appointed Tom Moyane as SARS commissioner.

In an email that November, Massone conceded that Bain could not claim much experience in the field. Bain was hired anyway. A contract meant to last six weeks, for about two point six million rand, grew into one that lasted twenty-seven months, and cost around one hundred and sixty-four million.

Source context: [3]

What went wrong

With Bain's help, Moyane restructured SARS. The Nugent Commission found the restructuring destroyed key units, including the large business center and enforcement teams. About two hundred senior managers were displaced. The Zondo Commission found that, exactly as the plan foresaw, specific people at SARS were "identified and neutralised." Investigations into tax evasion and illicit tobacco stalled. Reporting on the inquiry linked the damage to a revenue gap of about one hundred billion rand over four years.

Moyane was fired in November 2018. He has denied the allegations, and called the Nugent inquiry biased and unfair.

Source context: [3]

The reckoning

So, who paid? McKinsey returned nine hundred and two million rand to Eskom in 2018, and eight hundred and seventy million rand to Transnet in 2021. A court ordered Trillian to pay back five hundred and ninety-five million. Bain repaid about two hundred and seventeen million rand, with interest, and admitted its SARS contract was "irregular."

In 2022, Britain banned Bain from government contracts for three years. South Africa's Treasury banned it for ten. Bain says its people did not knowingly take part in state capture. And in December 2024, McKinsey's African arm agreed to pay one hundred and twenty-two point eight five million dollars to settle a United States bribery case.

Prosecutors said it had agreed to pay bribes to officials at Eskom and Transnet, through local partners, for inside information on contracts. A former senior partner, Vikas Sagar, pleaded guilty. McKinsey said he had hidden his conduct from the firm.

Source context: [1] [2] [5] [7]

EXHIBIT 03The reckoning covers multiple institutions and proceedings. Each finding belongs to its own case.Image: Original XLSlides animation; sources and image credits below.

THE SEQUENCE

A timeline of the case

  1. Bribery scheme period

    The US resolution describes conduct involving contracts at Eskom and Transnet. [1]

  2. Eskom repayment and apology

    The utility welcomed the repayment and the firm’s apology. [2]

  3. Nugent report

    A separate commission reported on SARS governance. [3]

  4. Transnet repayment

    McKinsey agreed to return additional fees to Transnet. [4]

  5. US resolution

    McKinsey Africa agreed to a DPA and criminal penalty. [1]

THE PRACTITIONER’S LENS · OUR ANALYSIS

Three institutions, several different stories

The label state capture can make a collection of events sound like a single transaction. That is a poor starting point for understanding the consulting cases. Eskom supplies electricity, Transnet operates transport infrastructure and SARS collects revenue. Their mandates, contracts and governance structures differ. The conduct examined in each matter should remain attached to the institution and proceeding that established it.

The McKinsey Africa US agreement provides a defined account of a bribery scheme involving Eskom and Transnet. The Nugent commission examined SARS administration and governance, including Bain’s work. A reader should not be led to believe that the US agreement resolves every allegation across all three institutions or that its findings are a conviction of every firm mentioned in the documentary.

Keeping the strands separate improves the analysis. It allows a public buyer to see whether the weakness involved partner selection, fee incentives, procurement authority, leadership interference or organisational redesign. Different failure mechanisms require different safeguards. A single instruction to improve ethics would leave much of the practical problem untouched.

A local partner needs more than a place on the proposal

Partnership arrangements can have legitimate purposes, including building local capacity and providing skills the lead firm lacks. A due-diligence review should establish that purpose in concrete terms. What will the partner do? Who owns it? Who supervises its work? How is its compensation related to identifiable services?

Those questions become more important where a partner has close relationships with public officials or access to confidential procurement information. The review should examine the actual facts rather than assuming that local knowledge is either harmless or inherently improper. If the firm cannot explain an ownership chain or a material payment, the uncertainty should reach the approving authority before money moves.

Contract elementEvidence a buyer should requestWarning sign to examine
Partner roleNamed staff, work plan and deliverablesFees without a clear service
OwnershipBeneficial owners and relevant relationshipsUnexplained intermediaries
SelectionCompetitive process and recorded authoritySpecial access without an auditable basis
PaymentMilestones, invoices and approval trailCompensation detached from delivered work

This is a proposed procurement checklist, not a substitute for the legal findings. It also has limits: paperwork can be complete while the underlying conduct is improper. The reviewer needs the authority and information to test what happened in practice.

Test a savings fee against the public institution’s mandate

Performance-related fees can align an adviser with a client’s goals, but only if the baseline and the definition of success are credible. An apparent saving can arise from a revised assumption, a deferred expense or a change unrelated to the consulting work. A public body should know who independently verifies the benefit before agreeing to pay a share of it.

The review should also examine the quality of the outcome. An electricity utility has obligations beyond lowering one cost category. A transport operator has service and safety responsibilities. A tax authority must retain the capability to enforce the law. A model that values a narrow saving while ignoring damage to the mandate is incomplete even if its arithmetic is correct.

For a public-sector business case, define the baseline, the attribution method, mandatory service standards and the audit process on the same decision page. Do not ask the institution to approve an incentive structure whose most important terms will be settled later by the supplier.

Organisational redesign can change the ability to resist

The SARS strand raises a particularly important question for consulting practice: what does a restructure do to institutional challenge? An operating model changes reporting lines, responsibilities and access to information. It may also change whether experienced people can investigate a problem or challenge leadership.

A conventional organisation chart cannot show that effect by itself. The review should map decision rights and control activities before and after the change. Who can open an investigation? Who can stop a payment? Which specialist teams can demand evidence? Who can overrule them, and where is that decision recorded?

This is our analytical reading of the governance problem, not a new finding about a particular individual. It is useful because a redesign can appear efficient while reducing an institution’s capacity to perform its core function. The Enron case examines a parallel problem inside a company: a system can reward performance while making challenge harder.

An illustrative mandate-protection review

Imagine a fictional revenue agency considering consolidation of several specialist teams. The proposed chart reduces managerial layers and presents a lower personnel cost. Before accepting it, the agency should identify which functions require operational independence, which case files must remain accessible and which escalation routes must survive the transition.

The implementation plan should then state how ongoing investigations continue, how staff knowledge is retained and how the agency will detect a loss of enforcement capability. A six-month reduction in spending may look favourable while the organisation loses the expertise needed to collect revenue over several years.

The example is not a reconstruction of the SARS programme. It shows how to review a similar decision without treating the number of boxes on an organisation chart as a measure of institutional effectiveness. A strategy presentation should make the mandate test visible before the implementation roadmap.

A repayment can address the return of fees. An apology communicates a position about past conduct. A deferred prosecution agreement sets out obligations and an enforcement outcome. None should be treated as an interchangeable label for the others.

For a visual account, show the relevant institution, period, currency and legal basis beside each figure. Do not add a rand repayment to a dollar penalty without a defined purpose and conversion date. Avoid implying that several public announcements concern separate amounts if one agreement credits another payment.

The same discipline applies to company responses. A denial made before an investigation should be dated rather than displayed as though no later outcome exists. A later remediation statement should not erase the historical finding. A reader needs both the sequence and the final status supported by the sources used.

A practical brief for an independent public buyer

The strongest client brief defines a public problem, the capability gap, measurable outcomes and the constraints that cannot be traded away. It identifies the public official accountable for the decision and the independent reviewer who will examine the evidence. The adviser should not become the sole source of both the recommendation and its validation.

Deliverables should leave a usable record: source data, assumptions, contracts, versions, decisions and knowledge-transfer materials. The France consulting-spend case explores why authorship and public accountability matter even when buying expertise is legitimate. The Luanda Leaks case follows a related issue through a more complex payment chain.

For consultants, the practical test is whether the work strengthens the institution’s ability to act within its mandate. If a project delivers an attractive operating model while making scrutiny less effective, the review has missed a material part of the outcome.

TAKE IT INTO THE NEXT MEETING

Three practical lessons

01

Know the partner behind the proposal

Document beneficial ownership, political exposure, actual services and payment flows. A partner-development label is not a substitute for due diligence.

02

Test institutional effects

A redesign can change who has the expertise and authority to challenge decisions. Review that change alongside the operating model and cost savings.

03

Keep public accountability intact

The authority approving a contract must retain its own record, independent advice and ability to reject recommendations. Outsourcing analysis should not outsource responsibility.

Questions about the case

Were McKinsey and Bain involved in the same South African case?

Their controversies overlap in the wider state capture story but concern different engagements. The McKinsey Africa US resolution concerns Eskom and Transnet. Bain’s SARS work was examined separately, including by the Nugent commission.

What did McKinsey Africa agree to in 2024?

It entered a deferred prosecution agreement in a US case involving conspiracy to violate anti-bribery provisions and agreed to a $122.85 million criminal penalty. The agreement and factual statement give the relevant scope.

What should public-sector clients change?

Make ownership and payment flows transparent, preserve independent procurement and audit, and test whether organisational changes weaken an institution’s ability to enforce its mandate.

THE EVIDENCE TRAIL

Sources & editorial notes

Adapted from the original XLSlides documentary, with additional analysis. Published 29 October 2026. Sources have different roles: primary records, investigative reporting and the positions of affected parties.

  1. US Department of Justice: McKinsey Africa case documents ↗Information, DPA and December 2024 resolution.
  2. SAnews: Eskom welcomes McKinsey apology ↗Government reporting of the 2018 repayment and apology.
  3. South African Presidency: Nugent commission final report ↗The separate inquiry into SARS governance.
  4. amaBhungane: return of Transnet money ↗Original investigative reporting about the Transnet repayment.
  5. McKinsey: South Africa resolution statement ↗The firm’s response and its update on South African charges withdrawn in January 2025.
  6. Fortune: the Eskom and Trillian controversy ↗Contemporaneous reporting on the fee arrangement, partner dispute and McKinsey’s response.
  7. News24: South Africa’s 2022 Bain procurement ban ↗The dated ban announcement and the firm’s response; separate from the US McKinsey agreement.
Image credits & licences

Original illustrations and typography: XLSlides. Documentary stills have been resized and converted to WebP for this article. Underlying images retain the credits supplied with the episode.

  • Kevin Sneader, WEF 2019: World Economic Forum, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
  • Original paper-cut illustrations: XLSlides. Company and institution names identify the subjects of the reporting.

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