A settlement over what was not disclosed
On 19 February 2019, the U.S. Justice Department announced that McKinsey & Company would pay $15 million to resolve disputes with the U.S. Trustee Program over its disclosures in three corporate bankruptcies. The dispute was not about the quality of McKinsey’s restructuring advice. It concerned the sworn statements an adviser files so that a court can check for conflicts of interest.
CFO.com quoted the program’s director as saying McKinsey had shown “a lack of candor with the court”. McKinsey did not admit that any disclosure was insufficient. Behind the case stood a competitor, Jay Alix, the founder of AlixPartners, who had spent years pressing the issue. His role is central to the story, but his allegations remain allegations unless a court or regulator adopted them.
The clients
The clients were companies in trouble. Alpha Natural Resources was one of America's biggest coal miners. It dug coal and sold it to power plants and steel mills. Then coal prices fell, and cheap natural gas took its customers. On August the third, 2015, Alpha filed for bankruptcy, with ten point one billion dollars of assets, and seven point one billion dollars of debt.
Westmoreland Coal, another miner, went bankrupt too. At its Kemmerer mine in Wyoming, a judge let the company break its health and retirement contracts, to ease a sale. The third case was SunEdison, a renewable-energy company. Three bankruptcies. One adviser in all of them: McKinsey.
The rules
Chapter eleven bankruptcy lets a company keep running while it restructures its debts. But it has a price. The lawyers and advisers are paid out of the company's estate. That is money that would otherwise go to the people it owes: lenders, suppliers, workers. So a judge must approve every adviser. And under Bankruptcy Rule 2014, each one files a sworn statement, listing its connections to the debtor, the creditors and other parties.
The court uses that list to check for conflicts. As the head of the U.S. Trustee Program put it, "Transparency is the linchpin of the bankruptcy system."
The consultant
McKinsey first tried bankruptcy work in 2001. In 2011, it set up a dedicated unit, McKinsey Recovery and Transformation Services. It was a lucrative business. According to court filings reported by Institutional Investor, McKinsey took fourteen bankruptcy assignments and earned about one hundred and forty million dollars in fees. But rivals noticed something. Other advisers filed long lists of their connections.
McKinsey's lists were short. In some cases, according to a later lawsuit, its first statements named no connections at all. McKinsey said its disclosures met every legal requirement, and had been approved by the courts.
The rival
The rival was Jay Alix, a Detroit accountant who founded the turnaround firm AlixPartners in 1981. In 2014, he says, he raised his concerns directly with Dominic Barton, McKinsey's global managing partner. Alix says Barton promised to fix it. Barton's lawyer called that account false. Alix then did something unusual. He set up an investment firm, Mar-Bow, that bought debt in companies McKinsey was advising.
As a creditor, he could object in court. And he did, again and again. In 2018, he sued McKinsey under racketeering law. McKinsey's lawyers called the campaign the "vanity project of a narcissistic billionaire".
Follow the money
In 2018, Wall Street Journal reporting, as summarised by other outlets, said MIO Partners, the investment office that invests money for current and former McKinsey people, held stakes through hedge funds in the debt of companies McKinsey was advising in bankruptcy, including Alpha. The firm advising a debtor could therefore have an affiliate with an indirect economic interest in how creditors fared.
In January 2019, according to The Globe and Mail, a federal judge in Virginia reopened Alpha’s case after learning that McKinsey, through MIO, was among Alpha’s secured creditors. Alix alleged that MIO made about $50 million from Alpha’s debt; McKinsey disputed that figure. An affiliate’s holding is a disclosure fact. On its own, it does not show that confidential information was misused or that the restructuring advice was shaped by the investment.
Disclose the connection; let the court weigh it
- 01Map every party
List the debtor, creditors, affiliates and significant counterparties, including affiliated investment vehicles.
- 02Search the connections
Run the party list against clients, affiliates and holdings; record what was searched and what was found.
- 03Disclose and update
File specific disclosures and supplement them when new connections emerge during the case.
The settlement
The U.S. Trustee Program, the Justice Department’s bankruptcy watchdog, had challenged McKinsey’s disclosures. After mediation before a bankruptcy judge in Texas, McKinsey agreed to pay $15 million: $5 million in each of the Alpha, Westmoreland and SunEdison cases, for the benefit of creditors. The department described it as one of the highest repayments by a bankruptcy professional over alleged disclosure non-compliance. CFO.com reported that it equalled about a third of the fees McKinsey had billed in the three cases.
McKinsey did not admit that any disclosure was insufficient and said it had settled to move forward and focus on serving its clients. In Wyoming, the miners’ union asked for Westmoreland’s share to help replace lost benefits; a union official called $5 million “a drop in the bucket”. Separately, McKinsey agreed to pay $17.5 million to a SunEdison creditors’ litigation trust, a payment distinct from the $15 million.
The reckoning
The disputes did not end with the 2019 settlement. In November 2019, newspapers reported that federal prosecutors were examining McKinsey’s bankruptcy work. The Justice Department declined to comment, and the sources reviewed for this article report no charges. In Houston, the dispute over McKinsey’s disclosures in the Westmoreland case went to a lengthy trial. In December 2020 it was settled: McKinsey withdrew its application, gave up about $8 million in fees and agreed to disclose its affiliate connections in future cases. Mar-Bow argued that the promise was too vague. There was no admission of liability. McKinsey’s North America chairman called Alix’s litigation “vexatious and self-serving”, while Judge David R. Jones called the resolution unsatisfying.
The end of the feud
Alix's racketeering case went up and down the courts. In January 2022, an appeals court revived it. McKinsey asked the Supreme Court to step in. Justice Sonia Sotomayor refused to pause the case. But in July 2024, a judge in New York dismissed it. Alix, he ruled, had no right to sue. The claims belonged to AlixPartners, which had never handed them to him.
In August, Alix decided not to appeal. His lawyer said the suit had helped bring more than thirty million dollars in fines. McKinsey said Alix had "repeatedly failed to prove his case". Already in 2023, McKinsey had said it had no active bankruptcy cases, though its unit was not closing.
THE SEQUENCE
A timeline of the case
A dedicated bankruptcy unit
Institutional Investor dates McKinsey Recovery and Transformation Services to 2011. [4]
Alpha Natural Resources files
The coal miner enters Chapter 11 with McKinsey among its advisers. [13]
Racketeering suit and MIO reporting
Alix sues McKinsey; reporting describes MIO’s indirect holdings in clients’ debt. [4]
$15m U.S. Trustee settlement
McKinsey pays $5m in each of three cases without admitting insufficient disclosure. [1]
A reported criminal inquiry
Newspapers report a federal inquiry; no charges are reported. [7]
Westmoreland resolution
McKinsey gives up about $8m in fees and agrees to future affiliate disclosures. [5]
Appeals court revives the suit
The Second Circuit reinstates Alix’s claims for further proceedings. [8]
Suit dismissed; no appeal
A judge rules Alix lacked standing; he decides not to appeal. [10]
A disclosure is an input to someone else’s decision
The central idea in this case is simple to state and easy to forget under commercial pressure. In a Chapter 11 case, an adviser does not decide whether its own connections are a problem. It discloses them so that the court, the U.S. Trustee and other parties can make that judgment. The disclosure is therefore not a marketing document or a summary of the adviser’s confidence in its own independence. It is evidence supplied for an independent review.
That framing changes how a team should approach the work. The relevant question is not “Is this connection material in our view?” but “Would the people responsible for assessing conflicts reasonably want to know this?” A narrow answer to the first question can feel efficient. It also transfers a judgment that belongs to the court back to the party with the strongest interest in the outcome.
For advisers outside bankruptcy, the same discipline applies whenever a client, board or regulator relies on a declaration of independence. Board advisers, valuation experts, procurement consultants and transaction advisers all produce statements that other people use to decide whether to trust the work. The management consulting presentation guide is a useful reminder that a recommendation is only as credible as the evidence trail behind it.
Why the estate makes disclosure different
Bankruptcy adds a financial reason for care. Professional fees in a Chapter 11 case are generally paid from the debtor’s estate, which is money that would otherwise be available to creditors. Lenders, suppliers, retirees and workers can all have an interest in that estate. When an adviser’s fee comes from that pool, the people who ultimately bear the cost are not the executives who chose the adviser.
That is why the union’s reaction in Wyoming matters as context. A settlement payment to the estate is a legal and financial remedy. For the miners whose benefit contracts had been rejected, it was also a comparison with what they had lost. The two perspectives do not have to be reconciled to understand why disclosure rules in bankruptcy are strict. The process asks everyone paid from the estate to show that their loyalties are visible.
Affiliates make the conflict search harder
The MIO element connects this case to the Puerto Rico debt case, but the two should not be merged. Both raise a structural question: what happens when a professional-services firm is affiliated with an investment office whose holdings may overlap with the parties in a restructuring? In the bankruptcy cases, the reported holdings were indirect, through hedge funds. The legal issue was disclosure in court filings, not a finding that confidential information had been misused.
The practical problem is that a conventional conflict check searches a client list. An affiliated investment vehicle may not appear there. Its holdings may sit with outside managers, change frequently and be difficult for an engagement team to see. A firm that wants to make complete disclosures has to design a search that reaches those vehicles, records what was checked and explains any limits. “We could not see it” is a weaker answer than “We searched these sources on this date and found the following.”
That approach does not require an adviser to disclose everything in the world. It requires a defensible method, a documented scope and a willingness to supplement the record when new information appears. Those are process questions, which is why they can be audited.
A rival can be self-interested and still raise a real question
Jay Alix’s campaign is unusual because the challenger was a direct competitor who set up an investment vehicle in order to object as a creditor. McKinsey’s lawyers described his effort in harsh terms, and his racketeering suit was eventually dismissed for lack of standing. None of that answers the disclosure question either way. A rival can have commercial motives and still point to a gap that a regulator decides to pursue.
Leaders handling criticism should keep these two questions apart. First, is the critic’s factual claim correct, and what does the governing rule require? Second, what does the critic stand to gain? Answering the second question first can feel satisfying, but it risks missing the issue the court or regulator will actually examine. In this case the U.S. Trustee Program, not Alix, negotiated the 2019 settlement.
The same separation is useful when reading the record. Alix’s allegation that MIO made about $50 million from Alpha’s debt is his claim, disputed by McKinsey. A standing dismissal is also not a ruling that his allegations were false. A careful slide states each status precisely rather than letting the outcome of one proceeding stand in for another.
Count settlements carefully
This story contains several payments that are easy to combine incorrectly: the $15 million U.S. Trustee settlement across three cases, the separate $17.5 million SunEdison payment, and roughly $8 million in Westmoreland fees given up in 2020. Alix’s lawyer later said the litigation helped bring more than $30 million in fines. These figures have different counterparties, purposes and legal effects. Adding them into one headline number would blur that.
The same caution applies to percentages. CFO.com reported that the $15 million equalled about a third of the fees McKinsey billed in the three cases. That is a useful sense of scale, but it does not establish what the fees should have been, or how creditors’ recoveries changed. For practice with presenting costs and outcomes side by side, the business case calculator shows why each figure needs a label, a period and a source.
Scale is not an excuse
A large firm has more clients, more alumni, more investment relationships and more potential connections. That makes the conflict search harder, but it also makes it more important. The larger the network, the less likely it is that a short list of disclosed connections reflects reality. A short list from a large organisation should prompt a question about method before it reassures anyone about independence.
The Rajat Gupta case concerns individual misconduct rather than institutional disclosure, and it should not be used to imply wrongdoing here. It does illustrate why trusted institutions need controls that do not depend on any one person’s judgment about what others need to know.
Turn the lesson into a working checklist
Before filing any declaration of independence, a team can ask four practical questions. Who are all the parties whose connections the reviewer is entitled to see? Which internal and affiliated databases were searched, and which were not? Which connections were found, and how are they described? Who is responsible for updating the disclosure as parties change?
Present the answers as a short evidence summary rather than a reassurance. The executive summary slide generator can help structure that summary, but the content must come from the actual search. The Allstate claims case offers another reminder that documents prepared for one audience can later be read by courts and regulators. Write disclosures expecting that they will be.
TAKE IT INTO THE NEXT MEETING
Three practical lessons
Treat the list as evidence for someone else to judge
In a Chapter 11 case the court decides whether a connection matters. Disclose connections with enough specificity for that judgment rather than filtering them through your own view of materiality.
Include affiliates in the conflict search
An investment arm, pension vehicles and their outside managers can create economic interests in the parties to a case. Agree in advance how such holdings are identified and disclosed.
Separate the messenger from the message
A rival’s motives can be contested while the underlying disclosure question remains valid. Evaluate the record, the rule and the court’s response, not only who raised the issue.
Questions about the case
Did McKinsey admit wrongdoing in the $15m settlement?
No. McKinsey did not admit that any of its disclosures were insufficient or noncompliant, and said it settled to move forward. The U.S. Trustee Program’s criticisms are the regulator’s position, not a judicial finding against the firm.
Is this the same matter as the SEC’s 2021 MIO settlement?
No. The 2019 settlement concerned disclosures in three corporate bankruptcies. The SEC’s 2021 order concerned MIO’s safeguards for confidential information and is discussed in our Puerto Rico case.
What happened to Jay Alix’s racketeering lawsuit?
An appeals court revived it in 2022, but in July 2024 a federal judge dismissed it because Alix lacked standing: the claims belonged to AlixPartners, which had not assigned them to him. He did not appeal. A standing dismissal is not a ruling on the merits of his allegations.
THE EVIDENCE TRAIL
Sources & editorial notes
Adapted from the original XLSlides documentary, with additional analysis. Published 7 November 2026. Sources have different roles: primary records, investigative reporting and the positions of affected parties.
- U.S. Justice Department: U.S. Trustee Program $15m settlement with McKinsey, 19 February 2019 ↗Official announcement of the three-case disclosure settlement. Its body text did not render to automated reading; terms are cross-checked with CFO.com and Credit Slips.
- CFO.com: McKinsey fined $15M over disclosure failures, 20 February 2019 ↗Reporting of the U.S. Trustee director’s statements, the one-third-of-fees comparison and McKinsey’s no-admission position.
- Credit Slips (Stephen Lubben): Alix–McKinsey update, 19 February 2019 ↗Academic commentary quoting McKinsey’s statement and describing the mediated settlement.
- Institutional Investor: The man who would take down McKinsey, March 2019 ↗Investigative profile of Jay Alix: the bankruptcy unit’s history and fees, Alix’s and Barton’s competing accounts, Mar-Bow and the racketeering suit.
- Institutional Investor: Is the McKinsey–Jay Alix battle finally over?, December 2020 ↗The Westmoreland resolution, the $17.5m SunEdison payment and both sides’ reactions, including the judge’s.
- WyoFile: Wyoming coal bankruptcies and the McKinsey settlement, April 2019 ↗Local reporting on Westmoreland’s Kemmerer mine, broken benefit contracts and the miners’ union request.
- The Globe and Mail: McKinsey under investigation over bankruptcy advice, 12 November 2019 ↗Reporting of a federal criminal inquiry, citing other newspapers, and of the reopened Alpha case; no charges reported.
- Alix v. McKinsey & Co., Second Circuit, 19 January 2022 (FindLaw) ↗Appellate opinion describing Rule 2014 disclosures and Alix’s allegations; it revived the suit and did not decide the merits.
- Bloomberg Law: McKinsey faces discovery as Jay Alix’s suit is ordered to resume, April 2022 ↗Reporting that Justice Sotomayor declined to halt the case.
- Bloomberg Law: McKinsey beats Jay Alix’s RICO case over bankruptcy conflicts, July 2024 ↗Reporting of the dismissal for lack of standing.
- So What newsletter, summarising The Wall Street Journal, August 2024 ↗Secondary summary of Alix’s decision not to appeal, both sides’ statements and McKinsey’s 2023 bankruptcy caseload.
- Consulting.us: McKinsey waives millions in fees for Westmoreland Coal work, December 2020 ↗Trade reporting of the fee waiver and future-disclosure commitment.
- Virginia Business: Alpha Natural Resources files for Chapter 11, August 2015 ↗The owner’s cited source for Alpha’s filing date, assets and debts.
Image credits & licences
Original illustrations and typography: XLSlides. Documentary stills have been resized and converted to WebP for this article. Underlying images retain the credits supplied with the episode.
- XLSlides logo: XLSlides.
- McKinsey & Company logo: public domain (text logo).
- Kevin Sneader: World Economic Forum, CC BY 2.0.
- Other organisations are name cards, people silhouettes; everything else is drawn. Charts marked "illustrative" are not to scale.
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